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Abstract
In this paper we examine the impact of public spending, education, and institutions on 
income distribution in advanced economies. We also assess the efficiency of public 
spending in redistributing income by using a DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) non-
parametric approach. We find that public policies significantly affect income distribution, 
notably via social spending, and indirectly via high quality education/human capital and 
via sound economic institutions. Moreover, for our set of OECD countries, and within a 
two-step approach, several so-called non-discretionary factors help explaining public 
social spending inefficiencies. 
Keywords: income redistribution, public spending, efficiency, DEA. 
JEL Classification Numbers: C14, H40, H50. 5
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Non-technical summary 
Income distribution and the role of the market, the public sector and globalisation have 
gained increasing attention in recent years. In this paper we examine the impact of public 
spending, education, and institutions on income distribution in advanced economies from 
a cross-country perspective. This is, to our knowledge, an important and remarkable gap 
in the literature.  
This study examines empirically the role and efficiency of public spending policies in 
affecting income distribution from a cross-country perspective. The study first discusses 
conceptually the determinants of income equality: initial conditions and public policies 
affect income distribution directly (via the effect of taxes and spending) or indirectly (via 
the effect on earning opportunities, human capital and institutions). It then studies 
empirically the relation between distribution indicators on the one hand and public 
spending and policy outcomes on the other. To assess the efficiency of public spending in 
promoting and achieving more equalization of income, the study uses a non-parametric 
DEA approach, following, for instance, the analytical framework by Afonso, Schuknecht, 
and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD and by Afonso 
and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, b) for the education and health sectors. 
The study finds that redistributive public spending (except pensions) and education 
performance have a significant effect on income distribution as reflected in stylised facts 
and in the regression analysis. Results for the role of institutions and personal income 
taxes point in the right direction but are not robust while more open countries do not have 
less equal income distribution.  In addition, DEA analysis suggests that while some 
Southern and large continental European countries show a relatively consistent picture of 
low efficiency and some Nordic countries report relatively high efficiency, the picture is 
very variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency of 
public social spending is enhanced in countries with a strong education performance (and 
to a less robust extent education spending. The direct link from the institutional 
framework to income distribution appears more tenuous in regressions while the two-step 
analysis point to a strong indirect role with favourable institutional indicators 
significantly correlated with the efficiency of social spending.  6
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We must point to a number of caveats, notably the quality of data, the measurement of 
income distribution and the factors that influence it (including the appropriate measure of 
public spending) and the small number of observations. 
The analysis of exogenous factors has another caveat which implies some careful 
interpretation of the results. Treating non-discretionary factors such as PISA scores, 
institutions and GDP as exogenous explanatory variables in explaining efficiency, is 
certainly interesting and more policy relevant from a short-term perspective as it can help 
to gage their quantitative relevance. However, this should not serve as an excuse for poor 
income distribution indicators and efficiency but rather as an enticement to do better. The 
policy implication of this study is hence to improve on all these factors that are 
endogenous in the long run: keep spending as low and well-targeted as possible, improve 
education performance and strengthen the quality of the institutional framework and 
public administration. 7
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1. Introduction 
Income distribution and the role of the market, the public sector and globalisation have 
gained increasing attention in recent years. This study examines empirically the role and 
efficiency of public spending policies in affecting income distribution from a cross-
country perspective. This is, to our knowledge, an important and remarkable gap in the 
literature in advanced economies. The study first discusses conceptually the determinants 
of income equality: initial conditions and public policies affect income distribution 
directly (via the effect of taxes and spending) or indirectly (via the effect on earning 
opportunities, human capital and institutions). It then studies empirically the relation 
between distribution indicators on the one hand and public spending and other factors on 
the other.
To assess the efficiency of public spending in promoting and achieving more 
equalization of income, the study uses a non-parametric approach based on Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), following, for instance, the analytical framework by 
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the 
OECD and by Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, b) for the education and health 
sectors.
The study finds that redistributive public spending (except pensions) and education 
performance have a significant effect on income distribution as reflected in stylised facts 
and in the regression analysis. Results for the role of institutions and personal income 
taxes point in the right direction but are not robust while more open countries do not have 
less equal income distribution. In addition, DEA analysis suggests that while some 
Southern and large continental European countries show a relatively consistent picture of 
low efficiency and some Nordic countries report relatively high efficiency, the picture is 
very variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency of 
public social spending is enhanced in countries with a strong education performance (and 
to a less robust extent education spending. The direct link from the institutional 
framework to income distribution appears more tenuous in regressions while the two-step 
analysis point to a strong indirect role with favourable institutional indicators 
significantly correlated with the efficiency of social spending.  8
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The effectiveness and efficiency of policies to affect income distribution should not be 
seen as “God given” and the findings of the paper suggest significant scope for reform 
(and further work). The functioning of the institutional framework and the effectiveness 
and competence of government in providing education or in attaining the objectives of 
redistributional policies can be improved by appropriate policy reforms. In some cases, 
when policy targets are well-achieved efficiency gains may nevertheless be reached by 
spending less money (e.g. via better targeting). In some other cases, targets may not be 
achieved but a better use of existing funds might already be sufficient to improve things.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two provides conceptual 
considerations and reviews the literature on the determinants of income distribution and 
the role and efficiency of public policies in this regard. Section three provides some 
correlation and regression analysis in this regard. Section four and five set up and 
conduct the efficiency analysis public policies in equalizing income, using both DEA and 
Tobit analysis. Section six concludes. 
2. Income distribution and its determinants: some conceptual considerations 
What determines the distribution of income in a given country and at a given time? Why 
is the income distribution more even in some countries than in others? Can the 
distribution of income be changed through the intervention of the government? These 
and similar questions have been raised with increasing frequency by economists and 
political scientists. In the often undemocratic societies of the past, in which oligarchies 
ran governments, the distribution of income was seen as an almost natural condition of 
society. However, in modern, democratic societies, in which most adult citizens, rich or 
poor, have the right to vote for those who will represent them in the government, there is 
less tolerance for, or acceptance of, high inequality. As a consequence policymakers are 
pressured to introduce policies intended to make the distribution of income or of 
consumption more equal. Over the years the focus of attention has shifted form the 
distribution of (real) wealth to that of income and, more and more, to that of 
consumption. 
Robert W. Fogel, the 1993 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, has argued that until 
the last third of the 19th century, the concern of economists had been with equality of 
opportunities. Then over the next hundred years the attention shifted to the equality of 9
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material conditions such as food, clothing, lodging and so on. This objective could be 
achieved by taxing the rich with high and progressive income taxes while subsidizing the 
incomes or the consumption of the poor. However, progressively, because of the 
potential disincentive effects that taxes could generate and because of the concentration 
of income taxes on dependent workers, taxes lost some or much of their potential impact 
on income distribution. They acquired the characteristic of “fiscal churning” that is 
reshuffling of income that changes only marginally the whole distribution. At the same 
time the income transfers that had been focused on the poor were largely replaced by 
universal entitlement programs, especially in health and education, which benefited all 
citizens and not just the poor. Fogel (2000) argues that because material goods account 
for a progressively smaller share of total spending for most people, in the future the fight 
for more equality or equity will be directed to the distribution of immaterial goods.  
Overall, one should be aware of the fact that rising income inequality matters, as 
discussed, for instance, by Atkinson (1997), notably via its potential impact on economic 
growth. Additionally, and according to the results reported by Barro (2000), the effect of 
income inequality on economic growth may differ in developed and developing 
economies, somewhat in line with the Kuznets curve – whereby inequality first increases 
and later decreases during the process of economic development. Therefore, by focussing 
our empirical analysis on OECD countries we manage to address a more homogeneous 
country sample in that respect.
1
This paper deals mainly with the role that the government has played in promoting more 
income equality, than it would exist without its intervention, at a given time. It thus 
attempts to link policies at a given time with measures of income distribution at the same 
time. However, it must be recognized that past government policies have also played 
some role in determining the current income distribution. These policies have contributed 
to the determination of so-called initial conditions. This means that it may not be possible 
to isolate completely the impact of past and present public policy on income distribution. 
This must be kept in mind when assessing the econometrically determined impact of 
these policies in the later parts of this paper. 
                                                          
1 See also Bertola (2007), Garcia-Peñalosa (2007), Castello-Climent (2007) and Thomas Harjes (2007) for
a discussion of various aspects of the income distribution growth nexus. 10
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At a given point in time, and in a given country, without the current intervention of the 
government, through taxation, spending policies, and regulations, the income distribution 
that would emerge would be largely determined by the following factors: 
(a) The inheritance of tangible and financial wealth; 
(b) The inheritance of human capital, including within-the-family learning as well as 
the inheritance of attitudes toward learning, work, risk and so on. Whether 
inherited, genetic factors can play a role in this process is still a highly controversial 
area; the inheritance of useful connection, positional rents, and other valuable assets 
that determine a person’s social capital; 
(c) Societal arrangements and norms, such as whether individuals tend to marry 
individuals with similar wealth or educational background; real or de facto caste 
systems, and so on (see Tanzi, 2000); 
(d) Individual talent; 
(e) Past government policies. 
In addition to the initial conditions mentioned above, that are largely determined by 
inheritance and societal traditions and norms, there are more individually-nested, or 
random factors, which also play important roles. These are (a) the distribution of skills, 
intelligence, and even look not directly inherited and (b) what could be called luck, or the 
role that randomness plays in determining incomes in non-traditional and market-
oriented economies.  The chance that someone will end up with the skills or acumen of 
Tiger Woods, Bill Gates, or Warren Buffett cannot be determined by the initial 
conditions or by government policies. In a market economy, individuals with exceptional 
skills in various areas (entertainment, sport, economic or financial activities, and so on) 
are more likely to end up with exceptional incomes. In many cases luck (or a randomness 
factor) will also play a role.  Some of these individuals may end up in the annual Forbes 
or similar lists of the world richest individuals and will have an impact on Gini 
coefficients or on other measures of inequality. 
Initial conditions, exceptional skills, luck, and past public policies will combine with the 
working of the market to determine the distribution of income that prevails in a society 
before the current intervention of the government. Afterwards, to determine the 
distribution of spending power among the population the government steps in with taxes, 11
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public expenditures, tax expenditures, and some relevant regulatory policies. Relevant 
regulations will be (a) those that control prices or rents; (b) that determine hiring quotas 
for some categories of individuals; (c) that establish property rights for patents or for 
other forms of intellectual property; (d) that pursue anti-trust policies and so on. We shall 
not be able to take into account regulations in our empirical work and will also ignore the 
impact that progressive tax systems can have on the after tax distribution of income. 
Much of the focus of this paper will be on public spending and policy outcome and their 
impact on inequality. 
It may be worthwhile to stress that the impact of the government on the income 
distribution may be direct or indirect and that this distinction is in part linked with the 
current and past impact of the government. 
The direct and current impact of the government can come through taxes and through 
spending and other public policies. The level of taxation and its progressivity is the most 
direct factor. This factor, per se, can make the distribution of after-tax incomes different, 
and presumably more equal than the pre-tax distribution. However, various forms of “tax 
expenditures” that indirectly subsidize some categories of private spending – education, 
health, training, expenses connected with mobility, etc. – will undoubtedly, over time, 
have some impact on income distribution. Through its features, the tax system can also 
influence the retirement age, the size of families, and individual effort, which are all 
features with a direct impact on income distribution. 
On the expenditure side of public policies we can also identify direct and indirect effects.  
Public spending that injects income or spending power in the hands of individuals, 
through cash payment or direct support for spending that is important for poorer 
individuals (food stamps, subsidized housing, free child care for working mothers, 
subsidized tariffs for low levels of consumption of public utilities, etc.) has a clear effect 
on income distribution. However, public spending can have indirect but still significant 
effects on the distribution of income in other ways that mainly improve productivity and 
opportunities to find a job disproportionately for the less well off. For example an 
efficient public transportation system can widen the area in which poorer individuals can 
search for jobs by reducing travel costs. Spending for job training or retraining can move 
individuals from the unemployed to the employed category. Spending on education can 12
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benefit the poor disproportionately if it improves their relative endowment with human 
capital. Free access to health facilities can keep people healthy and make possible for 
them to be in the labour force.  
In addition to the above, it has to be recognized that a good institutional set up that 
guarantees rule of law and fair and quick access to justice will also contribute to a better 
distribution of income by reducing abuses and corruption. Some studies have, for 
example, linked corruption with higher Gini coefficients. When rule of law is not fair or 
is not respected, poorer people are more likely to be exploited through lower 
compensation for their work and higher costs for some services, as for example in the 
case of usury when they borrow money.  
The above description suggests clearly that while some public actions or policies have an 
immediate and direct impact on the distribution of income or on the income of some 
groups, others have an indirect impact or an impact only over time. Thus the empirical 
work that follows reflects some of these limitations because it is focused largely on 
current public spending on income distribution. 
3. Cross-country and historical assessment 
In this section, we first take a look at the data that underpins our analysis of income 
distribution, before providing some first descriptive statistics, correlations and regression 
analysis of the determinants of income distribution. We focus in particular on the impact 
of redistributional expenditure policies, education as a provider of human 
capital/opportunities and some tax policy and institutional issues.
3.1. Income distribution data: a brief stock-taking
Income distribution data reflects the different objectives of measurement.
2 We have 
identified five overall indicators. 1) The Gini coefficient is probably the most famous 
indicator where a low number suggests more equality and a high number inequality. 2) 
The income share per quintile is another popular indicator with the income share of the 
poorest or the poorest two quintiles being typically examined. Other indicators include 3) 
                                                          
2 Different measurements may not only have different objectives but also implicitly reflect the value-
judgement of analysts. The Gini coefficient for example measures the relative distribution within one 
society. A measure of per capita GDP for the poorest quintile across countries puts more weight on the 
absolute situation of the poor and the presumed trade-offs between income distribution and growth.13
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the poverty rate as the share of people with less than 50% (or any other share) of median 
income. These three indicators also allow cross-country comparisons with relative ease. 
4) The absolute poverty rate which looks at the share of people living below some pre-
defined threshold of income and 5) the absolute per-capita income of the poorest (or 
poorest two) quintile(s) are further alternatives. They are only reasonably comparable if 
they are adjusted (for the consumption basket or purchasing power parity). In addition, 
there are indicators that refer to segments of the population like 6) child poverty, 7) 
absolute child poverty or 8) old age poverty, to name only a few. 
A few further caveats are worth mentioning. Indicators can refer to gross income, factor 
income or disposable income. They can look at families, households, individuals or 
taxpayers. They can include or exclude the self-employed. The sources can be surveys, 
censuses, tax or social security records. This illustrates that great care needs to be 
applied, especially when comparing indicators across countries and over time. Finland, 
for example, reported for the year 2000 a Gini coefficient for disposable income of 26.4, 
of factor income of 47.2 and of gross income of 31.2. 
In a first step we would like to take stock of some of the available income distribution 
indicators and their distribution over time and countries. The largest dataset of Gini 
coefficients is to our knowledge published by WYDER which covers many countries and 
in some instances starts in the 19
th century.
3 Chart 1a illustrates the data distribution for 
the period 1950 until most recently. It shows a trend towards greater equality until the 
1980s followed by a more ambiguous pattern thereafter. But the chart also shows the 
enormous diversity of data for the reasons mentioned above. A reasonably homogenous 
and comparable dataset for Gini coefficients and disposable income is compiled by the 
Luxembourg income dataset in which, however, observations before 1980 are rather rare. 
Nevertheless, for the past 25 years the ambiguous pattern of the WYDER dataset is 
broadly confirmed (Chart 1b). From a global perspective, the World Development Report 
provides data for Gini coefficients and the income share per quintile for many countries 
and, via different vintages, different years. 
[Chart 1] 
                                                          
3 For an overview of historic developments also see Atkinson (2007). 14
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The most important data source for income distribution indicators for advanced countries 
seems to be the OECD. Foerster and d’Ercole (2005) have put together an excellent set of 
cross-country data for the period 1985 to 2000, including for sub-groups of society. 
Taking a glimpse also at this dataset, it is interesting to note that the only group which 
experienced an unambiguous further fall in poverty rates since the 1980s is the elderly 
while child-poverty has tended to increase (Chart 1c-d).
Changes over the past two decades can also be illustrated by plotting the Gini coefficient 
for 1980, 1990 and 2000, as in Chart 2. Observations below the 45 degree line reflect an 
equalisation in income distribution over this decade while those above suggest a 
tendency towards less equality. For instance, for the period 1990-2000, while all 
countries are relatively close to the 45 degree line, equality appears to have increased 
most notably in Denmark, the Netherlands, France and Switzerland while it decreases in 
the US, Belgium, Sweden and Finland. 
[Chart 2] 
3.2. Determinants of income distribution: some correlations 
Consistent with our earlier discussion of the likely determinants of income distribution, 
we conducted two types of quantitative analysis. This aims to get a better feel for the data 
and their interrelation. In this sub-section we conduct correlation analysis before, in the 
next one, we look at some simple regression analysis. We look at levels of indicators in 
recent years and at their changes over recent decades, as presented in Table 1 (for an 
overview of basic descriptive statistics see the Annex). 
Starting with the role of public finances, there is a relatively strong correlation between 
public expenditure and income distribution in recent years (Table 1a). This correlation, 
however, is somewhat weaker for total expenditure (correlation coefficients of about 0.5) 
than for redistributional components, i.e. social spending, transfers and subsidies and 
family benefits (about 0.5-0.7). The correlation between pensions and old-age poverty is 
relatively weak (see Foerster and Mira d’Ercole, 2005, for a discussion). There is also a 
much weaker correlation between public spending and absolute income indicators. This 
is illustrated in the fourth column which shows the correlation between public spending 
and PPP-based per-capita GDP of the poorest quintile across countries. 15
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There is a relatively strong correlation between the change in income distribution as 
measured by the change in the income share of the poorest 40% of households and the 
change in public spending between 1960 and 2000 (Table 1b). However, this relationship 
is already significantly weaker for the change in the Gini coefficient. Moreover, initial 
(unequal) income distribution is not a good predictor for subsequent spending increases. 
[Table 1] 
The magnitude of interrelations between income distribution and public spending can be 
illustrated very roughly by the bi-variate regressions displayed in Chart 3. To attain a 1% 
higher income share of the poorest 40% of households, it is necessary to rise social 
spending by roughly 3.3% of GDP (Chart 3a).
4 The correlation between the change in 
social spending and income distribution over the past 40 years is also rather positive 
(Chart 3b). 
[Chart 3] 
The picture changes significantly when looking at the past 20-25 years only. There is 
virtually no correlation between the change in total or social spending and income 
distribution since the 1980s (Table 1b).  Chart 4, as quoted from Heipertz and 
Warmedinger (2007) confirms this picture with part a) confirming the positive 
correlation of levels and part b) showing an even negative correlation between changes in 
social spending and the Gini coefficient since the mid 1980s.  
[Chart 4] 
This picture is consistent with the findings of two of the authors in an earlier study 
(Schuknecht and Tanzi, 2006) where countries that undertook ambitious expenditure 
reform and notably lowered social spending did not experience much adverse effects on 
                                                          
4 A 1% income share for the poorest two quintiles reflects an increase in relative per capita GDP in this 
group by about US$ 600 (given an average per capita GDP ppp across sample countries in 2000 of slightly 
below US$ 25000). A 3.3% of GDP spending increase implies roughly US$ 800 per capita. Perfect 
targeting would imply an increase in spending by US$250 per capita (fully spent on the poorest 40% and 
financed by the richest 60%). 16
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the income share of the poorest quintile of households. At the same time, absolute 
incomes of the poor increased most strongly in the group of countries that undertook 
early and ambitious reforms, starting already in the 1980s (Table 2). This may be due to 
the elimination of poorly targeted benefits (that helped poor little) and the improvement 
of incentives and employment opportunities (that benefited the poor disproportionately).
[Table 2] 
Synthesizing this first set of results, one can safely say that public and notably social 
spending matters for income distribution both in terms of levels and, perhaps a bit less 
strongly, for changes over the past 30-40 years. The picture, however, seems to have 
changed in recent decades when the correlation of changes in public social spending and 
income distribution may have broken down. We will come back to this issue in the next 
sub-section.
Turning to human capital as contributor to income distribution, there is also a 
surprisingly strong relationship between some measures of educational achievement 
(OECD PISA) and various income distribution indicators across countries (Table 1c). It 
is noteworthy that correlation coefficients between mathematical and problem solving 
skills and various income distribution indicators except old age poverty show high values 
above 0.4. Although the correlation coefficient with public education spending is 
similarly high, this may be spurious and reflect more the correlation of education and 
social spending than the human-capital related effects (as will also be shown in the next 
section). The correlation between public education spending and educational 
achievements is in fact very limited (see e.g., Hauptmeier et al., 2006). 
We only undertook a very tentative and limited glimpse at the effect of taxation by 
looking at personal income taxes which should have an equalising impact on income 
distribution through progressivity as also implied by correlation coefficients of above 0.4 
for personal income tax revenue and income shares and Gini coefficients (1d), assuming 
a link between the level of income taxes to GDP and tax progressivity. 
The effect of initial conditions on today’s income distribution can be assessed by 
correlating recent indicators with those of some decades ago. While the income share of 17
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the poorest two quintiles in 1960 and 2000 are not correlated, the 2000 Gini coefficient is 
still strongly related to that prevailing in about 1970 (1e).
Finally we look at institutional indicators and globalisation/openness (Table 1f). A strong 
correlation of better institutions and more income equality is confirmed for two of the 
four indicators, i.e., the degree of independence of the judiciary and the amount of red 
tape. Regulation quality and the size of the shadow economy appear to be less strongly 
correlated. The correlation between openness as measured by exports plus imports over 
GDP and income distribution is relatively high between 0.3 and 0.4 with more open 
economies having a more equal income distribution (contrary to some conjectures in the 
debate).
3.3. Determinants of income distribution: a first regression analysis 
In this section, we undertake some simple cross-section regression analysis. The 
hypotheses are that public spending and notably redistributional spending and the tax 
system affect income inequality directly. Education/human capital and the institutional 
framework of a country do so indirectly via equalising the human capital endowment and 
providing a level playing field. In the literature is has also sometimes been claimed that 
globalisation may undermine equality. Our findings from regression analysis support the 
hypotheses on the role of public redistributive spending and education/human capital, 
results are mixed for institutional indicators and insignificant for personal income taxes 
and openness. 
In a first set of equations, we look at income distribution across countries in recent years 
(about 2000) as measured by the income share of the poorest 40% of households and by 
the Gini coefficient (equations 1-4 in Table 3a). It is not very surprising that transfers and 
subsidies and social spending are highly significant in affecting income distribution. 
Coefficients around 0.3 suggest that 1% of GDP higher redistributive spending raises the 
income share of the poorest two quintiles by 0.3%. Despite the significant positive 
correlation, there is no significant correlation between personal income taxes and income 
distribution in any specification (including when replacing spending variables), although 
this could be largely due to multicollinearity with social spending. 
[Table 3a] 18
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Institutional variables have the right sign but they do not show a robust and significant 
direct relation with income distribution with variables reflecting red tape/bureaucracy, 
the size of the shadow economy and independent judiciaries being significant in some 
specifications. As mentioned, the positive relation between openness and income 
distribution is also supported in regression analysis but it is not significant (not 
indicated). The inclusion of GDP per capita and unemployment as additional control 
variables (proxying the possible growth-distribution trade off and the fact that the poor 
are typically disproportionately affected by unemployment) does not yield significant 
results in this set of equations (not indicated). 
In line with the earlier correlation analysis, education achievement on average and 
notably for mathematics and problem solving is significantly related to income 
distribution. About 25 points more in PISA imply a 1% higher income share of the 
poorest 40% of households (for reference, the largest difference in our sample countries 
is 75 points between Finland and Portugal, and the largest difference in the income share 
is 7.6% between Finland and the US). Ten PISA points improve the Gini coefficient by 
one point according to these regressions. The inclusion of education achievement also 
significantly enhances the overall fit (adjusted R-square) of the models. Education 
spending, by contrast, does not significantly affect income distribution. 
We also tested for the role of initial income distributions in 1960s/70s as reflecting initial 
conditions (wealth patterns, social norms and other factors that may change only very 
slowly over time). While this did not show up significantly in the equation on income 
shares for the poorest two quintiles (not indicated) it appears to be relevant for today’s 
Gini coefficients (in line with the findings on correlations above). 
There are two additional findings worth reporting which perhaps point to the need for 
more analysis. In equation 3 we use public education spending (an input indicator) 
instead of achievements (=output). This does not turn out to be a significant determinant 
of income distribution. In the same equation, however, regulatory quality becomes 
significant. The finding of insignificant institutional indicators in the other equations may 
hence be due to a correlation between education achievement and institutional quality 
(which may result in better policies including more efficient public education spending).  19
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A second finding worth commenting on is represented in equation 5 where we regressed 
the Gini coefficient on social spending and an interaction term between social spending 
and educational attainment. While the former reverses sign and is now highly positive 
(suggesting a negative effect on income distribution) the latter is strongly significant and 
negative, implying that only high social spending coupled with good education positively 
affects income distribution. We will come back to this point in the DEA analysis. 
A further equation 6 examines per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted) of the poorest quintile of 
households across sample countries, and suggests that each % of GDP of social spending 
raises per capita GDP of the 20% poorest households by US$232.
5 A higher 
unemployment rate is a significant factor in lowering the absolute income of the poorest 
quintile (a 1% higher unemployment rate lowers the income by 275$). Each additional 
PISA point raises income of the poor by about US$ 30. 
A first tentative effort to explain changes in income distribution is reflected in equations 
(1)-(4) of Table 3b. These equations have to be seen with even more caution than the 
earlier ones as indicators may be less comparable over time and as the number of 
observations are very limited. Nevertheless, the results are broadly consistent with the 
earlier correlation analysis. Over long horizons, rising redistributive spending mattered 
and, for example, the change in the social spending ratio between 1960 and 2000 had a 
significant impact on the change in the income share of the poorest 40% of households 
(equation 1) while the finding is less robust for the Gini coefficient (equation 2). Personal 
income tax receipts have an equalising but non-robust effect on income distribution while 
the initial Gini level is correlated inversely with subsequent changes.
6
[Table 3b] 
                                                          
5 This implies that if the growth effect of lower social spending is 2 ½ times as high as the income effect, 
then the poor would be absolutely better off from reform. If reforms are designed in a manner that the 
income effect is smaller (e.g. through better targeting) then the threshold for the poor to benefit from higher 
growth will also be lower. 
6 While we do not have time series data for education attainment, including the 2000 value is not very 
meaningful as this assumes no change in education quality. Doing so just for illustrative purposes in 
equations (2) and (4) suggests borderline significance. 20
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When looking at changes over the past 20 years, public spending variables do not provide 
a robust picture. This is in line with the earlier findings from correlation analysis and the 
literature. Unlike for the longer horizon, initial income distribution is also not relevant for 
explaining subsequent changes. The results for education achievements (despite the 
above-mentioned caveat) are fully consistent with the earlier cross-section results.
All in all, income distribution appears to be significantly affected by public redistributive 
spending and education achievements. This relationship, however, does not appear to be 
very robust for changes, especially over the past 20 years. Moreover, there are hints that 
the beneficial effects of such spending may interact with better education quality. Results 
for the role of institutions and personal income taxes are not robust while more open 
countries do not have less equal income distribution.  Further analysis beyond these very 
preliminary findings is certainly needed. 
4. Efficiency of public spending
4.1. Literature 
Previous research on the performance and efficiency of the public sector that applied 
non-parametric methods find significant divergence of efficiency across countries. 
Studies include notably Fakin and Crombrugghe (1997) for the public sector, Gupta and 
Verhoeven (2001) for education and health in Africa, Clements (2002) for education in 
Europe, St. Aubyn (2003) for education spending in the OECD, Afonso, Schuknecht, and 
Tanzi (2005, 2006) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD and in 
emerging markets, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, 2006b) for efficiency in 
providing health and education in OECD countries.
7 De Borger and Kerstens (1996), and 
Afonso and Fernandes (2006) find evidence of spending inefficiencies for the local 
government sector. Most studies apply the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method 
while Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006a) undertook a two-step DEA/Tobit analysis, in the 
context of a cross-country analysis of secondary education efficiency. Nevertheless, little 
or no work has been done using such non-parametric methods to assess the efficiency of 
public policies in affecting income distribution. 
Another relevant issue for the analysis of public spending inefficiencies is the fact that 
public expenditure financing must rely on distortional taxation. This implies that both 
                                                          
7 See also Joumard et al. (2004) for additional information on OECD countries. 21
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direct and indirect costs are relevant when estimating the economic impacts of 
inefficiency in public services provision. Indeed, the relative importance of indirect costs 
of public sector provision inefficiency, linked to financing through distortional taxation, 
increases with the magnitude of the inefficiency. Afonso and Gaspar (2007), in simple 
numerical exercises, with a calibrated model, found that indirect costs, associated with 
excess taxation burden, amplify the cost of inefficiency by between 20 and 30 per cent. 
4.2. Non-parametric and parametric analysis 
Non-parametric approach 
Together with the set of already identified outputs, a set of inputs will be used to assess 
efficiency regarding income distribution measures. Among such inputs we can mention, 
as potential candidates, social spending, transfers and subsidies, spending on pensions, 
health, and education, tax and institutional indicators. Sometimes, principal component 
analysis may prove useful to reduce the number of variables used in the input side. In 
order to perform the efficiency study we use the DEA approach. 
The DEA methodology, originating from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and popularised 
by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex production 
frontier. The production frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using linear 
programming methods. The term “envelopment” stems from the fact that the production 
frontier envelops the set of observations.
8
Regarding public sector efficiency, the general relationship that we expect to test can be 
given by the following function for each country i:
) ( i i X f Y   , i=1,…,n   (1) 
where we have Yi – a composite indicator reflecting our output measure; Xi – spending or 
other relevant inputs in country i. If ) ( i i x f Y  , it is said that country i exhibits 
inefficiency. For the observed input level, the actual output is smaller than the best 
attainable one and inefficiency can then be measured by computing the distance to the 
theoretical efficiency frontier.
                                                          
8 Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA. 22
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The analytical description of the linear programming problem to be solved, in the 
variable-returns to scale hypothesis, is sketched below for an input-oriented specification. 
Suppose there are k inputs and m outputs for n Decision Management Units (DMUs). For 
the i-th DMU, yi is the column vector of the inputs and xi is the column vector of the 
outputs. We can also define X as the (kun) input matrix and Y as the (mun) output 
matrix. The DEA model is then specified with the following mathematical programming 
problem, for a given i-th DMU:
9
,
s. to    0
           0

















 .  (2) 
In problem (2), G is a scalar (that satisfies Gd1), more specifically it is the efficiency 
score that measures technical efficiency. It measures the distance between a country and 
the efficiency frontier, defined as a linear combination of the best practice observations. 
With G<1, the country is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), while G 1 implies that 
the country is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
The vector O is a (nu1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to compute 
the location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient, and 1 is an n-
dimensional vector of ones. The inefficient DMU would be projected on the production 
frontier as a linear combination of those weights, related to the peers of the inefficient 
DMU. The peers are other DMUs that are more efficient and are therefore used as 
references for the inefficient DMU.. The restriction  1 ' 1   O n  imposes convexity of the 
frontier, accounting for variable returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would amount 
to admit that returns to scale were constant. Problem (2) has to be solved for each of the n
DMUs in order to obtain the n efficiency scores. 
                                                          
9 We simply present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), using the 
duality property of the multiplier form of the original programming model. 23
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Using non-discretionary factors 
The analysis via composite performance indicators and DEA analysis assumes that 
expenditure efficiency is purely the result of discretionary (policy and spending) inputs. 
They do not take into account the presence of “environmental” factors, also known as 
non-discretionary or “exogenous” inputs. However, such factors may play a relevant role 
in determining heterogeneity across countries and influence performance and efficiency. 
Exogenous or non-discretionary factors can have an economic and non-economic origin.  
As non-discretionary and discretionary factors jointly contribute to country performance 
and efficiency, there are in the literature several proposals on how to deal with this issue, 
implying usually the use of two-stage and even three-stage models (see Ruggioero, 
2004). Using the DEA output efficiency scores, we will evaluate the importance of non-
discretionary factors below in the context of our new member and emerging market 
sample. We will undertake Tobit regressions by regressing the output efficiency scores, 
GL, on a set of possible non-discretionary inputs, Z, as as follows 
i i i Z f H G    ) ( .   (3) 
5. Efficiency analysis results 
5.1. Relative efficiency via a DEA approach 
As a starting point of our efficiency analysis we computed the DEA efficiency scores 
from a one input and one output specification. As an input measure we use total public 
social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, as an average for the period 1995-2000.
10 Our 
output measure is based on the Gini coefficient data, also as an average for the period 
1995-2000. Since in the DEA programme we need to insert increasing outputs as the 
desired objective, and given that higher Gini coefficients imply a bigger inequality in 
terms of income distribution, our output variable, Gini
T, is constructed by transforming 
the Gini coefficient observations as follows:
100
T Gini Gini   .   (4) 
                                                          
10 Social expenditure includes public and  (mandatory and voluntary) private social expenditure at 
programme level and the main social policy areas are: old age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits, 
health, family, active labor market programmes, unemployment, housing, and other social policy areas. See 
the Data Annex and OECD (2007) for more details on how the OECD defines social expenditures.  24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 861
January 2008
Table 4 reports the results for the input and output oriented efficiency scores for the 
above described one input-one output model for a set of 26 OECD countries. From an 
output oriented perspective the most efficient countries in terms of influencing income 
distribution via social expenditure appear to be the Nordic countries, Japan, the 
Netherlands, and Slovakia while Anglo-Saxon and Southern European countries, 
Germany and France appear to be less efficient. On the other hand, and even if it may be 
more difficult to act in the short-run on the input side, it should be noticed that input 




th, and Australia 9
th) than the Nordic countries, apart from Denmark, which is on 





More concretely, the production possibility frontier is constructed with three countries: 
Denmark, Japan and the Slovak Republic, which envelop all the other countries (see also 
Chart 5).
11 Additionally, in Table 4 we report the ranking of the countries, given their 
respective efficiency scores (Rank 1) and taking into account, for the countries on the 
frontier, the number of times each of those countries is a peer of a county outside the 
frontier Rank 2). 
[Chart 5] 
Still from Table 4 we conclude for the existence of both input and output inefficiencies 
when relating the use of public social spending to assess the inequality in income 
distribution. The average input efficiency score is 0.76 implying that for the overall 
country sample it would be theoretically possible to attain the same level of income 
distribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient, with roughly 24 percent less public 
social spending. The average output efficiency score is 0.93, which means that with the 
same level of public social spending one could in principle increase income equality 
indicators by 7 percent. (This reflects the very low marginal product of higher spending 
in terms of equality as reflected in the rather flat production possibility frontier.) 
                                                          
11 Note that we did not consider Korea in the sample since it biases the findings (however, results with 
Korea area available upon request). Indeed, social spending-to-GDP ratio for Korea was extremely 
(roughly four times) below the sample average. 25
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Naturally, such averages encompass rather heterogeneous realities. For instance, several 
individual input efficiency scores are closer to the production possibility frontier (the US, 
the Czech Republic, Ireland, Canada, Luxembourg or Australia) while there are also 
situations were the room for improvement seems to be larger (France, Belgium, Italy, 
Germany, and Poland). On the other hand, output efficiency scores exhibit overall lower 
volatility with the relative positioning of the countries showing some differences vis-à-
vis the results for the input oriented case (the correlation between the two rankings is 
around 0.6). 
We also specified two alternative models that consider one input (social spending as 
before) and two output indicators, both income inequality measures: the Gini coefficient 
and the poverty rate or the income share of the poorest 40% of the population. Again as 
in the case of the Gini coefficient we had to transform the poverty rate data in the same 
fashion. Tables 5 and 6 report the results of these two one input and two outputs models. 
[Table 5]  
[Table 6] 
The estimation of these models shows two things. First, input efficiency scores are 
somewhat higher. Second, in the models with two outputs, Southern European countries, 
the UK, France and Germany continue to show low efficiency of social expenditure. But 
a few countries, including a number of Anglo-Saxons (Canada, Ireland, the US and 
Australia) are now rather efficient and the Nordic countries do not drop dramatically..  
Among the 22 country sample as reported in Table 5, six countries are on the production 
possibility frontier: Canada, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg and the US. Ireland 
is efficient by default in the output oriented specification since it is never a peer of any 
other country outside the frontier. Moreover, the US is a bit of a special case since it has 
in this country sample both the lowest public social spending as a % of GDP and the 
worst values for the two output indicators, Gini and poverty rate. 26
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For the estimation presented in Table 6, there are seven countries on the production 
possibility frontier: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway and the 
US. Interestingly, we can also observe that both Finland and the US are labelled as 
efficient by default, respectively for input and output orientation. Finland is not the 
highest spending country in terms of the social spending-to-GDP ratio but it has one of 
the best Gini indicators and the best performance in terms of the income share of the 
poorest 40%.
As an additional illustration, Chart 6 shows in two dimension the production possibility 
curve for the output-oriented case, for the model involving a single input (social 
spending) and two outputs (Gin and income share of the poorest 40%). From the picture 
it is possible to notice that Ireland has done the best in the income share of 40%-to-social 
spending ratio while the US has done better in the Gini-to-social spending ratio. Together
these two countries form the efficiency frontier in the context of constant returns to scale, 
as also shown in Table 6, putting an upper bound on the production possibilities for this 
particular 1 input and 2 outputs specification.  
[Chart 6] 
Overall, the results of this analysis should be seen as illustrative. While they reflect the 
significant data and measurement problems they are perhaps a first useful step in this 
largely unexplored domain. We summarise in Table 7 the main findings of our non-
parametric efficiency analysis, confirming the very different degrees of efficiency across 
industrialised countries as we already detected in the earlier stylised facts. 
[Table 7] 
5.2. Explaining inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors 
As an additional step, we extend our analysis to exogenous (non-discretionary) factors 
that might explain expenditure efficiency. The output efficiency score outcomes of the 
first two models as reflected in tables 4 and 5 serve as dependent variables.
As to exogenous factors, it is probably reasonable to conjecture that expenditure 
efficiency depends on the “technology” applied and skills available in the public sector, 27
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on institutional factors that influence, for example, the ability of private agents to protect 
their resources from public claims, on the monitoring capacities of public and private 
agents, and on international constraints. We proxy these considerations with the 
following independent variables: Education levels and education spending stand for 
human capital endowment that should increase the productivity of the public sector and 
facilitate its monitoring. Competence of the civil services more concretely proxies public 
sector “technology”. Institutional variables (independent judiciary, red tape, shadow 
economy, regulation quality) should signal the security of property rights and sound 
checks and balances that boost efficiency in public spending. Amongst other control 
variables, the population share above 65 aims to capture “competition” over public 
resources while openness aims to gauge international influences. Per capita GDP is an 
indicator of capital stock in the economy (that should lead to better technology) but we 
also face a causality problem: rich countries may be rich because they are more efficient 
in their redistribution (by discouraging rent seeking and other wasteful activities).
As a first step we look at correlations across dependent and independent variables. We 
report the correlation matrix for efficiency scores and several potentially relevant non-
discretionary factors in the Annex. In a nutshell there seems to be significant correlation 
between expenditure efficiency on the one hand and PISA scores and several institutional 
variables on the other. Correlations are less high with education spending (consistent 
with the earlier regression analysis) and openness. When looking at correlations across 
independent variables (exogenous factors) it appears that the same institutional variables 
that are correlated with efficiency also show a strong relation with PISA scores and 
public sector competence while again public spending and openness show relatively 
lower coefficients. This observation points to multicollinearity problems for our 
regression analysis for certain variables with the economic intuition that countries with 
strong institutions are also likely to have efficient public sector policies in both the 
education and social domain. 
Keeping this caveat in mind, regression analysis is broadly supportive of the above 
claims. More specifically, Tables 8 and 9 report the results from the Tobit analysis using 
the previously computed output efficiency scores from the DEA models respectively in 28
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Tables 4 (1 input and 1 output) and 5 (1 input and 2 outputs).
12 It is noteworthy that PISA 
scores, the competence of civil servants, the quality of the judiciary and a small shadow 
economy are significant variables for explaining social expenditure efficiency. In 
addition high public education spending (only model 1), low property tax revenue and 
high per capita GDP contribute to explaining efficiency scores. Other variables are 
insignificant except for the elderly population ratio in model 2. Note, however, that the 
sample size ranges from only 18 to 22 countries, hence again suggesting to treat the 
results as illustrative. 
[Table 8] 
[Table 9] 
In Tables 10 and 11 we report output efficiency score corrections for specifications 1 and 
5 in Table 9 for the variables detected as statistically significant in the Tobit analysis 
(i.e., per capita GDP, PISA indicator, public spending in secondary education and the 
extent of shadow economy). The corrections were computed by considering that the non-
discretionary factors varied to the sample average in each country, and countries’ 
efficiency scores are then being corrected downwards if they have an above average per 
capita GPD and PISA scores. The output scores corrected for non-discretionary or 
environmental effects (truncated to one when necessary) are presented in columns four 
and five of Tables 10 and 11 respectively as a result of the sum of the previous three and 
four columns. One should also notice that, for instance in Table 11, the number of 
countries considered decreased from twenty-three in the DEA calculations to eighteen in 
the two-step analysis, since data for public spending in secondary education and the 
shadow economy were not available for all countries. 
[Table10]
[Table11]
                                                          
12 We try to explain output inefficiency via exogeneuos factors given that policy makers are sometimes 
input constrained, being therefore more feasible to improve ouptut and outcomes using the same inputs. 29
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The findings suggest a revision of efficiency scores and a reshuffle of the ranking of 
countries. Some inefficient countries appear to be so mainly due to exogenous factors, 
notably Greece, Portugal or New Zealand (to name only a few) where low per capita 
GDP results in a big adjustment parameter. Additionally, we illustrate in Chart 7 the 
changes in the efficiencies scores after taking into account the corrections prompted by 
the non-discretionary factors identified for models in Tables 10 and 11. Again, this is 
only a first step and much more analysis appears needed. 
[Chart 7] 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines empirically the role and efficiency of public spending policies in 
affecting income distribution from a cross-country perspective. The study first discusses 
conceptually the determinants of income equality: initial conditions and public policies 
affect income distribution directly (via the effect of taxes and spending) or indirectly (via 
the effect on earning opportunities, human capital and institutions). It then studies 
empirically the relation between distribution indicators on the one hand and public 
spending and policy outcomes on the other. To assess the efficiency of public spending in 
promoting and achieving more equalization of income, the study uses a non-parametric 
DEA approach, following, for instance, the analytical framework by Afonso, Schuknecht, 
and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD and by Afonso 
and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006a, b) for the education and health sectors. 
The study finds that redistributive public spending (except pensions) and education 
performance have a significant effect on income distribution as reflected in stylised facts 
and in the regression analysis. Results for the role of institutions and personal income 
taxes point in the right direction but are not robust while more open countries do not have 
less equal income distribution.  In addition, DEA analysis suggests that while some 
Southern and large continental European countries show a relatively consistent picture of 
low efficiency and some Nordic countries report relatively high efficiency, the picture is 
very variable for Anglo-Saxon countries. Moreover, effectiveness and efficiency of 
public social spending is enhanced in countries with a strong education performance (and 
to a less robust extent education spending. The direct link from the institutional 
framework to income distribution appears more tenuous in regressions while the two-step 30
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analysis point to a strong indirect role with favourable institutional indicators 
significantly correlated with the efficiency of social spending.  
We must point to a number of caveats, notably the quality of data, the measurement of 
income distribution and the factors that influence it (including the appropriate measure of 
public spending) and the small number of observations. 
The analysis of exogenous factors has another caveat which implies some careful 
interpretation of the results. Treating non-discretionary factors such as PISA scores, 
institutions and GDP as exogenous explanatory variables in explaining efficiency, is 
certainly interesting and more policy relevant from a short-term perspective as it can help 
to gage their quantitative relevance. However, this should not serve as an excuse for poor 
income distribution indicators and efficiency but rather as an enticement to do better. The 
policy implication of this study is hence to improve on all these factors that are 
endogenous in the long run: keep spending as low and well-targeted as possible, improve 
education performance and strengthen the quality of the institutional framework and 
public administration. 
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Data annex 
Table A1 – Descriptive statistics and sources 
   Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Source 
Income distribution           
Income share, poorest 2 quintiles, 2000  20.5  23.7  16.1  2.8 
Income share, poorest 2 quintiles, 1980  18.4  21.2  15.7  1.5 






Gini coefficient, 2000 29.3  36.8  24.7  4.6 
Gini coefficient, 1970 29.8  35.1  22.4  4.7 




Poverty rate, 2000  9.7  17.0  5.4  3.9  All other OECD 
Per capita income poorest quintile, 2000, PPP  10240.6 12989.9 7369.7 1696.7   
Child poverty  10.7  21.9  2.8  6.8   
Poverty rate in old age 13.5  25.6  5.9  6.4   
Fiscal data (all public, % of GDP)           
Total expenditure, 2000  45.8 57.1  32.5  8.0  AMECO 
Social expenditure, 2000  24.2 29.5  14.2  4.3  OECD 
Transfers and subsidies, 2000  16.1  21.3  8.6  3.8  AMECO 
Total expenditure, 1960  17.7 30.6 3.0  7.1  AMECO,  T&S 
Social expenditure, 1960  12.9 20.5 6.9  4.0  OECD 
b
Transfers and subsidies, 1960  6.0  9.7  1.3  2.9  AMECO, T&S 
Family benefits, 2000  2.1  3.7  0.4  1.0  OECD 
Pension spending, 2000  9.1  11.8  5.2  2.5  OECD 
Public education spending  5.3  7.7  3.8  1.0  OECD 
Personal income tax receipts  12.1  26.9  5.4  5.2  OECD 
Education achievement/PISA (2003)           
Average 505.9  545.9  461.7  23.3  OECD 
Maths 507.1  544.0  445.0  29.6  OECD 
Problem solving  507.1  548.0  448.0  28.5  OECD 
Institutions          
Judiciary
$ 6.0  6.7  4.5  0.7 
Regulation 
$ 3.6  5.3  2.4  0.9 
Bureaucracy 




Other controls           
Openness ((X+M)/GDP)  79.9  256  22.4  51.1  WEO 
Per capita GDP, 2000, PPP  24294.8  31741.0  14979.0  3834.6  OECD 
Unemployment rate (%), 2000  6.7  11.7  2.5  3.0  OECD 
Notes:
a – Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). Income distribution data, http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.htm.
b – Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure.
The OECD defines social expenditures as “The provision by public and private institutions of benefits to, 
and financial contributions targeted at, households and individuals in order to provide support during 
circumstances which adversely affect their welfare, provided that the provision of the benefits and financial 
contributions constitutes neither a direct payment for a particular good or service nor an individual contract 
or transfer.” Still according to the OECD, “social benefits include cash benefits (e.g. pensions, income 
support during maternity leave, and social assistance payments), social services (e.g. childcare, care for the 
elderly and disabled) and tax breaks with a social purpose (e.g. tax expenditures towards families with 
children, or favourable tax treatment of contributions to private health plans)” (see OECD, 2007). 
$ - Scale from 1 to 7 base don survey data. 34
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Table A2 – Correlation matrix for output efficiency scores and non-discretionary factors 








ation Rights Open 
E F O 1   1                   
EFO2  0.69  1                 
EFO3  0.69  0.91  1                
GDP  0.47  0.70  0.70  1               
PISA  0.64  0.63  0.51  0.37  1              
PIT  0.41 0.52 0.39 0.43 0.60  1              
Edu 0.29  0.28  0.15  -0.07  0.24  0.41  1            
Comp  0.65 0.81 0.63 0.55 0.75 0.62 0.26  1               
Judic  0.70 0.79 0.71 0.57 0.81 0.55 0.15 0.81  1             
Shadow  -0.48 -0.72 -0.61 -0.64 -0.80 -0.53 -0.05 -0.71  -0.79  1           
Pop65  -0.04 -0.61 -0.58 -0.35 -0.39 -0.11  0.16 -0.42  -0.49  0.60  1         
Redtape  -0.55 -0.50 -0.45 -0.45 -0.50 -0.19 -0.29 -0.42  -0.63  0.41  0.12  1       
Regulat. 0.38 0.43 0.56 0.35 0.53 0.22 0.12 0.32  0.53  -0.57  -0.42  -0.56  1     
Rights  0.56 0.66 0.53 0.79 0.61 0.28 -0.09 0.67  0.69  -0.80  -0.29  -0.40 0.25  1   
Open  0.45 0.31 0.32 0.23 0.25 0.44 0.08 0.30  0.24 0.05  -0.09  -0.46 0.11  0.07  1 
Notes:
EFO1, EFO2 and EFO3, output efficiency scores from the DEA models 1, 2 and 3, reported respectively in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
GDP – per capita GDP, ppp, 2000. 
PISA – OECD PISA indicators on secondary performance, 2003. 
PIT – Personal income tax revenues as a % of GDP, 2000. 
Edu – public spending in education as % of GDP, average for 2000-2001. 
Comp – index of competence of public officials, 2001/02. 
Judic – index for the quality of judiciary, 2000/01. 
Shadow – index of the informal sector in the economy, 2001/02. 
Pop65 – share of population aged 65 years and above, 2000. 
Redtape – index for bureaucracy, 2000/01. 
Regulat – index of the burden of regulation, 2000/01. 
Rights – index of property rights protection, 2001/02. 
Open – degree of openness of the economy: (Imports+Exports)/GDP, 2003. 35
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Tables and charts
Table 1 – Income distribution, public expenditure, education achievements, taxes,  initial 











(less than 50% 
of median 
income), 2000 















   DI4000  GI00  POTO00  PABS00  POCH00  POCH200  POLD00 
a)  Public spending, % 
of GDP            
Transfers and subsidies, 
2000 0.60 -0.57 -0.59  0.29       
Social spending 2000  0.61  -0.56  -0.65  0.46       
Total spending, 2000  0.52  -0.49  -0.48  0.18       
Family benefits, 2000          -0.73  -0.73   










1980-2000    
b) Change in public 
spending, % of GDP             
Social spending, change 
1960-2000 0.73          




2000 0.14  -0.04   
Total spending, change 
1960-2000 0.72          




2000 -0.20  -0.09   
Transfers and subsidies, 
1960-2000 0.70          
Transfers and subsidies, 
1970-2000  -0.39
Transfers & 
subs. 1980-2000  0.31 0.20   
   DI4000  GI00  POTO00  PABS00  POCH00  POCH200  POLD00 
c) Education 
achievements and 
spending             
  Mathematics  0.46  -0.49  -0.57  0.35  -0.50  -0.49  -0.23 
  Projects  0.45  -0.43  -0.60    -0.55  -0.55  -0.27 
  Science  0.20  -0.14  -0.46    -0.37  -0.37  -0.22 
  Reading  0.31  -0.27  -0.32    -0.35  -0.34  -0.02 
Public education 
spending 0.51  -0.53      -0.67     
   DI4000  GI00        DI4000  GI00   
d) Taxation      
f) Institutions
and openness1/      
Personal income tax 
receipts, % of GDP  0.41  -0.46   
Independ.
Judiciary 0.45  -0.48   
e) Initial conditions      
Regulation
quality 0.10  -0.09   
Income share poorest 
40% households, 1960  -0.16     
Size shadow 
econ. -0.25  0.30   
 Gini coefficient 1970     0.57      Red tape  -0.49  0.42   
       Openness  0.36  -0.39   
1/ A higher index number implies a more independent judiciary and higher quality regulation but more red 
tape and a larger shadow economy. 36
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Table 2 – Income distribution and expenditure reform 
a. Gini coefficient      
   Mid-1980s  Mid-1990s  2000  mid-1980s-2000 
Average, all countries  28.0  29.0  29.4  1.3 
Euro area  28.7  29.5  29.6  0.9 
b. Income share of poorest quintile of households
   Mid-1980s Mid-1990s  2000  mid-1980s-2000 
Average, all countries  8.6%  8.4%  8.2%  -0.4% 
Euro area  9.0%  8.7%  8.5%  -0.4% 
      
Ambitious reformers, early  9.4%  8.9%  8.9%  -0.5% 
Ambitious reformers, late 9.9%  10.0%  9.4%  -0.5% 
Timid reformers, early  8.3%  8.0%  7.8%  -0.5% 
Timid reformers, late  8.3%  8.1%  7.9%  -0.4% 
Non reformers  7.9%  7.6%  7.6%  -0.3% 
c. Per-capita GDP poorest quintile, 1995 prices, PPP US$
   Mid-1980s  Mid-1990s  2000  mid-1980s-2000 
       %  change 
Average, all countries  7374  8677  9893  34.2 
Euro area  6917  8128 9458  36.7 
      
Ambitious reformers, early  7273  8456  10400  43.0 
Ambitious reformers, late  9213  10532  11813  28.2 
Timid reformers, early  6936 8141 9036  30.3 
Timid reformers, late  7735  9047  9860  27.5 
Non reformers  4299  4984  5819  35.4 
Source: Schuknecht and Tanzi (2006) based on Förster and d’Ercole (2005). 37
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Table 3a – Income distribution determinants, cross section regression analysis 
Dependent variables 
Income share, 
poorest 40% of 
households, 2000 






 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 








(-3.93)      
Social spending 2000 












(-1.17)      
Per capita income 
ppp, 2000           
0.41 
(7.12)*** 
Amount of red tape/ 
bureaucracy 
-1.90 
(-1.72)       
Gini 1970 








achievement, total     
-0.86***






(2.56)          
Education, problem 






(1.38)       
Social spending 
education        
-0.004*** 
(-4.22) 
No. of observ. 
17 18  22  11  22  18 
R² adj.  0.58 0.52  0.56  0.92  0.66  0.86 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  38
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Change in income share, 
poorest 40% of households, 
1980-2000 
Independent variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Social spending change 
1960-2000 
0.39* 
(1.91)      








Transfers & Subsidies 
change 1980-2000      
0.23** 
(2.76) 







(-3.34)    
Education achievements, 











No.of observations  15 10  19  16 
R² adj.  0.79 0.59  0.11  0.38 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent.  39
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Table 4 – Model1, DEA results of income distribution efficiency, 1995-2000 
(1 input, public social expenditure; 1 output, Gini coefficient) 
Input oriented  Output oriented 
Country  VRS
TE
Rank 1  Rank 2  VRS 
TE
Rank 1  Rank 2 
Peers 
Input / output  CRS
TE
Australia  0.808 9  9 0.923 16  16  JAP / SVK, JAP  0.799
Austria 0.644  19  19  0.938  11  11  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.580
Belgium 0.607  25  25  0.932  13  13  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.549
Canada  0.833 7  7 0.941 10  10  JAP, SVK / SVK, JAP  0.803
Czech  Republic 0.903 5  5 0.974  7  7  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.790
Denmark  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  2  - 0.537
Finland 0.797  10  10  0.981  4  4  DNK, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.571
France 0.549  26  26  0.912  18  18  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.513
Germany 0.618  23  23  0.936  12  12  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.553
Greece 0.640  20  20  0.854  24  24  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.604
Hungary 0.708  15  15  0.905  19  19  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.703
Ireland  0.888 6  6 0.929 14  14  JAP / JAP, SVK  0.856
Italy 0.608  24  24  0.861  22  22  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.581
Japan 1.000 1  1 1.000  1  3  - 1.000
Luxembourg  0.827 8  8 0.980  5  5  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.703
Netherlands 0.774  11  11  0.972  8  8  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.662
New Zealand  0.746  14  14  0.876  21  21  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.714
Norway 0.747  13  13  0.975  6  6  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.630
Poland 0.633  22  22  0.903  20  20  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.632
Portugal 0.751  12  12  0.845  26  26  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.694
Slovak Republic  1.000 1  2 1.000  1  1  - 0.836
Spain 0.700  16  16  0.856  23  23  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.657
Sweden 0.655  18  18  0.966  9  9  DNK, JAP / DNK, SVK  0.506
Switzerland 0.637  21  21  0.928  15  15  JAP, SVK / DNK, SVK  0.590
United Kingdom  0.656  17  17  0.854  25  25  JAP / DNK, SVK  0.618
United  States  0.982 4  4 0.913 17  17  JAP / JAP, SVK  0.902
Average 0.758    0.929 0.676
Notes: 1) Social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, annual average for the period 1995-2000; Gini coefficient, 
annual average for the period 1995-2000. 2) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 3) Rank 2, 
countries in the production possibility frontier are ranked taking into account the number of times they are peers of 
countries outside the frontier. 4) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency frontier. 5) CRS TE is constant 
returns to scale technical efficiency. 
DNK – Denmark; JAP – Japan; SVK – Slovak Republic. 40
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Table 5 – Model2, DEA results of income distribution efficiency, 1995-2000 
(1 input, public social expenditure; 2 outputs, Gini coefficient, poverty rate) 
Country 
Input oriented  Output oriented 
 VRS 
TE
Rank 1  Rank 2  VRS 
TE
Rank 1  Rank 2 
CRS
TE
Australia 0.966  7  7  0.988  10  10  0.886 
Austria  0.795 15  15 0.978 14  14  0.643 
Belgium  0.748 18  18 0.973 15  15  0.609 
Canada 1.000 1  1 1.000  1  4  0.890 
Finland  1.000 1  4 1.000  1  1  0.633 
France  0.714 22  22 0.980 12  12  0.569 
Germany  0.747 19  19 0.970 17  17  0.613 
Greece  0.718 21  21 0.910 22  22  0.672 
Hungary  1.000 1  2 1.000  1  3  0.810 
Ireland  1.000 1  5 1.000  1  6  0.949 
Italy  0.721 20  20 0.927 20  20  0.651 
Luxembourg 1.000 1  3 1.000  1  1  0.779 
Netherlands  0.935 10  10 0.991  9  9  0.734 
New Zealand  0.960  8  8  0.985  11  11  0.824 
Norway 0.937  9  9  0.994  7  7  0.699 
Poland  0.855 11  11 0.972 16  16  0.710 
Portugal  0.851 12  12 0.943 18  18  0.792 
Spain  0.785 16  16 0.922 21  21  0.735 
Sweden  0.838 13  13 0.994  8  8  0.561 
Switzerland  0.811 14  14 0.979 13  13  0.654 
United  Kingdom  0.784 17  17 0.933 19  19  0.705 
United States  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  4  1.000 
Average 0.871    0.971  0.733 
Notes: 1) Social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, annual average for the period 1995-2000; Gini coefficient, 
annual average for the period 1995-2000; Poverty rate, data for 2000. 2) VRS TE is variable returns to scale technical 
efficiency. 3) Rank 2, countries in the production possibility frontier are ranked taking into account the number of 
times they are peers of countries outside the frontier. 4) Countries in bold are located on the VRS efficiency frontier. 5) 
CRS TE is constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 41
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Table 6 – Model3, DEA results of income distribution efficiency 
(1 input, public social expenditure; 2 outputs, Gini coefficient, income share of poorest 
40%)
Country 
Input oriented  Output oriented 
 VRS 
TE
Rank 1  Rank 2  VRS 
TE
Rank 1  Rank 2 
CRS
TE
Australia 0.963  8  8  0.983  10  10  0.895 
Austria  0.830 10  10 0.953 11  11  0.691 
Belgium  0.768 16  16 0.941 13  13  0.645 
Canada 1.000 1  2 1.000  1  3  0.924 
Denmark  1.000 1  6 1.000  1  2  0.626 
Finland  1.000 1  7 1.000  1  5  0.701 
France  0.660 21  21 0.916 16  16  0.587 
Germany  0.806 13  13 0.949 12  12  0.667 
Greece  0.700 19  19 0.871 21  21  0.697 
Ireland  1.000 1  1 1.000  1  6  1.000 
Italy  0.673 20  20 0.875 19  19  0.666 
Luxembourg 1.000 1  4 1.000  1  1  0.812 
Netherlands 0.935  9  9  0.988  8  8  0.758 
New  Zealand  0.829 11  11 0.926 15  15  0.808 
Norway  1.000 1  5 1.000  1  4  0.783 
Portugal  0.781 14  14 0.895 18  18  0.779 
Spain  0.775 15  15 0.901 17  17  0.767 
Sweden  0.824 12  12 0.984  9  9  0.608 
Switzerland  0.766 17  17 0.939 14  14  0.674 
United  Kingdom  0.706 18  18 0.874 20  20  0.700 
United States  1.000 1  3 1.000  1  7  1.000 
Average 0.858    0.952  0.752 
Notes: 1) Social expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, annual average for the period 1995-2000; Gini coefficient, 
annual average for the period 1995-2000; Income share of poorest 40% of the population, data for 2000. 2) VRS TE is 
variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 3) Rank 2, countries in the production possibility frontier are ranked 
taking into account the number of times they are peers of countries outside the frontier. 4) Countries in bold are located 
on the VRS efficiency frontier. 5) CRS TE is constant returns to scale technical efficiency. 42
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Table 7 – Descriptive statistics of DEA efficiency scores and model specification 
 Model1  Model2  Model3 
Average Input 0.758  0.871  0.858 
Output 0.929  0.975  0.952 
Maximum 1  1  1 
Minimum Input 0.549  0.714  0.660 
 Output  0.845 0.910 0.871 



















Output 0.049  0.029  0.048 
Nº of DMUs  26  22  21 
Nº of efficient DMUs  3  6  7 
DMUs on the frontier 
DNK, JAP, SVK  CAN, FIN, 
HUN, IRL, LUX, 
USA
CAN, DNK, 
FIN, IRL, LUX, 
NOR, USA 
Inputs
- public social 
expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
- public social 
expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
- public social 
expenditure as a 
% of GDP 
Outputs
- Gini coefficient  - Gini coefficient 
- Poverty rate 
- Gini coefficient 
- Income share of 
poorest 40% 
DMUs efficient by 
default
  IRL (out)  FIN (in), USA 
(out)
Note: summary of VRS TE results. 43
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Table 8 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(dependent variable: output efficiency scores from Model 1 in Table 4) 















































    -0.021 
(-0.99) 
% of pop. aged 
65 and over 
      - 0 . 0 0 5  
(-1.08) 
H V ˆ 0.042 0.038 0.037 0.040 0.037 0.047 
Nº  of  observ.  22 20 19 19 20 22 
H V ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of H
The z statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. 
Table 9 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(dependent variable: output efficiency scores from Model 2 in Table 5) 





















































     -0.024*** 
(-2.11) 
% of pop. aged 
65 and over 
       -0.009*** 
(-3.68) 
H V ˆ 0.019 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.016 
Nº  of  observ.  20 19 19 18 18 19 20 
H V ˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of H
The z statistics are in brackets. *, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively. 44
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Table 10 – Corrected output efficiency scores (for specification 1 in Table 9)














Australia 0.988  0.003 -0.014 0.978  9 
Austria 0.978  -0.007 0.002 0.973  13 
Belgium 0.973  0.000 -0.009 0.965  15 
Canada 1.000  -0.008 -0.017 0.977  10 
Finland 1.000  0.004 -0.025 0.981  7 
France 0.980  0.007 -0.004 0.983  6 
Germany 0.970  0.006 0.000 0.976  12 
Greece 0.910  0.048 0.023 0.979  8 
Ireland 1.000  -0.013 -0.002 0.985  4 
Italy 0.927  0.009 0.016 0.951  18 
Luxembourg 1.000  -0.090 0.037 0.947  19 
Netherlands 0.991  -0.004 -0.012 0.976  11 
New Zealand  0.985  0.030 -0.013 1.000  1 
Norway 0.994  -0.016 0.006 0.984  5 
Portugal 0.943  0.045 0.018 1.000  1 
Spain 0.922  0.029 0.010 0.961  16 
Sweden 0.994  -0.002 -0.004 0.988  3 
Switzerland 0.979  -0.015 -0.007 0.957  17 
United Kingdom  0.933  0.010 -0.015 0.929  20 
United States  1.000  -0.037 0.009 0.972  14 
Average  0.973 0.000 0.000 0.973   
Note: the corrected scores do not always add up to the indicated sum since for the cases were the result 
was above one it was truncated to the unity. 





















Australia 0.988  -0.006  0.006  -0.014  0.973  10 
Austria 0.978  -0.010  -0.006 0.000 0.963  13 
Belgium 0.973  -0.003  -0.006  0.010  0.973  9 
Canada 1.000  -0.012  0.000  -0.012  0.977  7 
Finland 1.000  0.001  -0.007  -0.014  0.980  6 
France 0.980  0.001  -0.005  -0.005  0.971  11 
Germany 0.970  0.000  0.007  -0.002  0.975  8 
Greece 0.910  0.031  0.015  0.027  0.982  4 
Ireland 1.000  -0.037  0.009  -0.002  0.970  12 
Italy 0.927  0.002  0.006  0.012  0.947  16 
Netherlands 0.991  -0.007  0.005  -0.007  0.981 5 
New Zealand  0.985  0.026  -0.010  -0.012  0.989  3 
Portugal 0.943  0.037  -0.005  0.029  1.000  1 
Spain 0.922  0.021  -0.009  0.010  0.944  17 
Sweden 0.994  0.004  -0.014  0.005  0.989  2 
Switzerland 0.979  -0.010  0.003  -0.012  0.960  14 
United Kingdom  0.933  0.002  0.008  -0.005  0.939  18 
United States  1.000  -0.039 0.004  -0.009 0.955  15 
Average 0.971  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.971   
Note: the corrected scores do not always add up to the indicated sum since for the cases were the result 
was above one it was truncated to the unity.45
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Chart 1 – Income distribution data: an overview 
1a 1b 
1c 1d 
Notes: POCH50 – Child poverty, 2000; POLD50 – old-age poverty, 2000.  

































































LOESS Fit (degree = 1, span = 0.3000)46
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 Chart 2 – Gini coefficient, 
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Chart 3a – Social spending and income share of poorest 40% households, 2000 
y = 0.3064x + 13.222
R
2
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Chart 3b – Social spending & income share, poorest 40% households, change 1960-2000 
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Chart 4 – Income distribution and social spending reform 
4a
4b
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Chart 6 – Production possibility frontier, constant returns to scale, one input (social 
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Chart 7 – Change in efficiency scores after correction: +(-), DMU moves closer to 
(further away from) the production frontier 
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